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Iraqi Elections: The Struggle for Influence and Political Transformations from 2010 to 2025

Iraqi Elections: The Struggle for Influence and Political Transformations from 2010 to 2025

🔴**Iraqi Elections: The Struggle for Influence and Political Transformations from 2010 to 2025**

📄**Introduction**

👌The Iraqi elections are not merely a contest for parliamentary seats, but rather an arena of power struggle—between various factions, between popular forces and armed organizations operating parallel to the state, and between regional and international actors. Over the past two decades, experience has shown that electoral victory does not guarantee control over governance due to the sectarian quota system and the political balances imposed on Iraq following the U.S. occupation in 2003.

⚪️**2010 — The Victory of the “Iraqiya List” and the Failure to Form a Government**

💳In the March 2010 elections, the Iraqiya List led by Iyad Allawi—a Shiite politician close to the United States—won the largest number of parliamentary seats (91). Washington presented this list as a “moderate national alternative” to the Shiite parties aligned with Iran and viewed it as an opportunity to restore political balance after Nouri al-Maliki’s first term. However, Allawi failed to form the largest bloc in parliament due to post-election coalitions led by al-Maliki, supported by Shiite and Kurdish parties and indirectly backed by Tehran. This event marked a turning point: Washington realized that ballot boxes alone do not guarantee its interests unless accompanied by post-election political engineering.

⚪️**2018 — American Diplomatic Intervention and Efforts to Influence Alliances**

📄After the May 2018 elections, the United States reemerged in the Iraqi scene through an intense diplomatic campaign led by U.S. envoy Brett McGurk, who played an active role in the government formation process. Reports from Reuters and __The Washington Post__ at the time revealed that McGurk held repeated meetings with Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish leaders to coordinate a pro-Western alliance. The American objective was to prevent Iran-aligned forces from seizing power; yet, those efforts failed due to strong domestic resistance and the complexity of internal balances. Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government was formed despite Washington’s reservations, after which the U.S. began exploiting public anger by supporting the October 2019 protest movement that ultimately brought down the government.

⚪️**2021 — The Sadrist Movement’s Victory and the Failure to Form a Majority Bloc**

🗂In the October 2021 elections, the Sadrist Movement won first place with 73 seats and sought to form a “national majority” government in alliance with Masoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and Khamis al-Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance. However, the majority project failed due to disputes over sovereign positions and the resistance of the Coordination Framework—a coalition of Shiite forces and resistance factions that view U.S. influence as a threat to Iraq’s sovereignty. The Sadrists withdrew from parliament, leaving the stage for the Coordination Framework to form the current government. Observers noted that this withdrawal weakened Washington’s undeclared project to reorganize the political blocs in line with its regional interests.

⚪️**2022 — The Sadrist Withdrawal and Pressure through Saraya al-Salam**

👋After the failure of the majority bloc project, the Sadrist Movement turned to its armed wing, __Saraya al-Salam__, as a tool of political and popular pressure. In August 2022, Sadrist supporters stormed the Green Zone — home to the parliament and government buildings — with implicit support from then-Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who was accused by opponents of closeness to Washington. From a local Iraqi perspective, the storming was not a coup against the state but rather an attempt to restore balance within the political process and reject monopolization of power. The Popular Mobilization Forces, as an official arm of the Iraqi state, intervened to protect government institutions and contain the crisis. In the aftermath, Muqtada al-Sadr announced his withdrawal from politics, maintaining his symbolic role as an external voice of opposition.

⚪️[**2025**](https://t.me/observer_5/198)** — The Upcoming Elections and the Opportunity for U.S. Influence**

✌The elections scheduled for October 2025 come amid growing U.S. influence in the region following the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the fall of the Syrian regime allied with the Axis of Resistance, and the rise of a Western-aligned Syrian government that sits at the same table with Israel. Washington seeks to capitalize on this regional momentum to secure a new foothold in Baghdad by influencing electoral outcomes and post-election alliances, using economic, diplomatic, and media tools to pressure nationalist forces. The U.S. goal is clear: to weaken parties with strategic ties to Iran and to ensure Iraq remains within the American sphere of control — even at the expense of the country’s unity and sovereign independence.

🎛[**Analysis**](https://t.me/observer_5/198)

✌The facts from 2010 to 2025 show that Iraq’s political balance is fragile, oscillating between internal will and external pressures. Post-election alliances are often built upon regional and international understandings rather than reflecting the voters’ true will. Thus, understanding the Iraqi landscape requires an internal reading rooted in the people’s suffering and their rejection of foreign dependency, rather than through a Western lens that reduces Iraq to a mere “sphere of influence.”

✌In this context, the arrival of U.S. Special Envoy **Mark Savaya** in Baghdad just days before the elections raises legitimate questions about the objectives and suspicious timing of his visit. While Washington frames it as a “visit to support the democratic process,” many observers see it as an undeclared attempt to redraw Iraq’s political balance or steer upcoming alliances in a way that preserves U.S. dominance within Iraqi institutions.

👌Appointed by President Donald Trump in [October](https://t.me/observer_5/198) 2025 as the Special Envoy to Iraq, Savaya declared that his goal was to “rebuild trust and strengthen the strategic partnership between Baghdad and Washington.” However, the timing of his movements—immediately before the elections—raises questions about whether his visit carries implicit pressure or veiled promises to specific candidates, or if it is a preemptive move to prevent the rise of anti-U.S. or pro-Resistance political forces.

✌This American presence during a sensitive pre-election period cannot be separated from the long history of U.S. interference in Iraqi affairs, nor from Washington’s persistent desire to keep Iraq within its strategic orbit, even through the “soft diplomacy” that hides behind slogans of democracy and stability. Is Savaya seeking to back certain political figures? Or is he preparing the ground to impose economic and security conditions after the results are announced? Whatever the answer, the timing alone exposes legitimate doubts about American intentions and reaffirms that Washington’s concept of “democracy” often becomes a tool to shape nations’ choices to suit its own interests.

✌This heightened political presence before the vote puts Iraq’s sovereignty to the test and revives a fundamental question: Are Iraqis truly free to choose their future, or is the decision still being made in foreign capitals?

**📌**[**Conclusion**](https://t.me/observer_5/199)

🔹 Iraqi voters are increasingly disillusioned and frustrated with the accumulation of corruption across successive [governments](https://t.me/observer_5/199), the weakness of basic services, and the marginalization of citizens in state policies. This frustration is clearly reflected in the declining voter turnout, as data indicates that nearly one-third of eligible voters have not registered with the Independent High Electoral Commission — a clear expression of lost confidence in the political process.

🔹 Nevertheless, [Iraqis](https://t.me/observer_5/199) cannot sacrifice major sovereign issues under the weight of this legitimate anger. Safeguarding the country’s territorial unity, protecting national wealth, and ensuring access to international waters are existential matters that must not be offered up as concessions to short-term economic demands or partisan rivalries. The looming water crisis is a striking example of a sovereign challenge that demands a unified national stance — not submission to foreign dictates or the blackmail of regional and international powers.

**🔵**[Link to the article in Arabic ](https://t.me/almuraqb/217)