Timing Policy: Why Is the Issue of the Hashd and Weapons Being Raised Now?

The real question is not: Should weapons be monopolized by the state? But rather: Why is this file being opened now, specifically? Who determines its timing? And in the interest of which political or regional project?

Timing here is not a technical detail, but a high-level political decision. It reflects a shift in the conflict from direct military confrontation to the management of power through law, pressure, and mediation.

After Gaza: When the Confrontation Moved from the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table

After the Gaza war and the expansion of regional clashes, the Axis of Resistance entered a phase of systematic political neutralization. The goal is no longer to break these forces militarily, but to strip them of their deterrent functions—especially in arenas that can be managed politically… foremost among them, Iraq.

In this context, the slogan of monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state is no longer just a reformist demand, but a regional pressure tool to remove Iraq from deterrence equations without firing a single bullet.

In Detail:

1. Regional and International Context – Post-Gaza Pressure on the Axis of Resistance

After the Gaza war and the expansion of indirect regional confrontation, the Axis of Resistance—including Iraqi factions—came under direct American–Western scrutiny. The Western message is clear:

Armed ideological forces cannot continue to exist outside full political control in states meant to remain within “managed stability.”

Iraq, by virtue of its geopolitical position, is the most fragile link in this axis, and therefore the easiest to pressure indirectly through:

• The government • Judicial institutions • International discourse on “state and sovereignty”

Here, the slogan of monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state is recycled as a political entry point, not as a comprehensive institutional-building process.

2. Inside Iraq – A Weak State Seeking Balance

Domestically, the Iraqi state suffers from:

• Structural weakness in security decision-making • Multiple centers of power • Chronic political division • Popular pressure on sovereignty and services

In such a context, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—as the most organized and influential force outside ministerial calculations—become a structural problem for the weak state. Not because they are outside the law, but because in some files they are stronger than the state’s institutions themselves.

This reveals a dangerous contradiction:

• Instead of strengthening the state to absorb the force • The proposal is to dismantle the force to fit the weakness of the state

3. Internal Political Agenda – Rearranging Power Balances

Raising these files now also serves conflicts within the Shiite political house itself:

• Forces seeking to reduce the influence of armed factions • Forces aiming to re-centralize decision-making in the hands of the government • Forces fearing the persistence of weapons outside the logic of electoral competition

Turning the PMF into a ministry, or merging it, practically means:

• Subjecting it to sectarian quotas • Bringing it into the game of balances • Breaking its decision-making independence

This opens the door to redistributing influence within the state.

Key Information: Baghdad–Tehran Negotiations

According to Radio Monte Carlo International:

• Baghdad is conducting direct negotiations with Iran • The goal: to help persuade other factions to accept disarmament • And to facilitate the process without clashes or security problems

The most important part of the leak is not the negotiations themselves, but the nature of the “dilemma” as described by Monte Carlo:

The biggest dilemma is not individual weapons, but the possession by some factions of missile capabilities and factories for drones and rockets.

Here, all cosmetic narratives collapse. The problem is not a rifle, nor a stray weapon, the problem is missiles.

In other words: the problem is with strategic deterrent capability, not internal security.

PMF and Factions: The Need to Differentiate

What is the PMF?

• An official legal force • Established by law • Theoretically and practically under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces • Not a militia, nor an organization outside the state

The PMF was born from the fatwa of the religious authority at a moment of existential danger, when military units collapsed, the state retreated, and Iraq was left alone to face ISIS.

What are the factions? Within the PMF:

• They are the nucleus of its founding • Multiple factions • Different political and ideological loyalties • Divergent positions on the state and weapons

Some factions:

• Declared readiness to regulate weapons • Linked this to the withdrawal of foreign forces • Consider their weapons as resistance arms not subject to the traditional logic of the state

Confusing the PMF as an institution with factions as organizations is deliberate misrepresentation.

Weapons Monopoly: Between the Religious Authority and Political Exploitation

The Religious Authority’s Position The supreme religious authority clearly called for:

• Weapons to be monopolized by the state • Rule of law • Prevention of foreign interventions

But the authority:

• Did not propose dismantling the PMF • Did not demand eliminating deterrent elements • Did not grant political authorization for selective use of its discourse

What is happening today is invoking the name of the authority to cover projects that were never built on the completion of the state in the first place.

Positions of Factions and Political Forces

Factions According to Judge Faiq Zaidan:

• Four factions declared commitment to the principle of weapons monopoly • Without announcing actual surrender of strategic capabilities

In contrast:

• Other factions refuse to give up their weapons before clear sovereignty conditions are met

Political Forces

• Muqtada al-Sadr: explicitly calls for weapons monopoly by the state and rejects any weapons outside it • Ammar al-Hakim: encouraged regulating weapons and integrating them into state institutions

These positions reflect a struggle within the Shiite political house over:

• Who holds power? • Who decides its future? • How influence is redistributed?

Proposed Scenarios: What Is Being Prepared for the PMF?

So far, two scenarios are on the table—without official announcement:

Scenario One: Turning the PMF into a Ministry

• A minister • Sectarian quotas • Political decision instead of field decision • Bringing the PMF into the balance game

Scenario Two: Dismantling and Merging

• Dissolving the institution • Distributing individuals across Defense and Interior • Ending the exceptional status • Terminating its special identity

In both cases: The PMF as we know it today will not remain.

Can the Axis of Resistance Hand Over Its Weapons?

The Lebanese experience with Hezbollah shows that:

• Resistance weapons are not surrendered unless:• The state is capable • The enemy is gone • Guarantees are real

In Iraq, the question is not: Do factions want to hand over weapons? But rather: Is the state capable of bearing what is required of it after removing the missiles?

Conclusion: The Core of the Battle Is Not Weapons… But Function

This debate is not about:

• A rifle • Discipline • Administrative organization

It is about:

• Who holds the deterrence decision? • Who defines Iraq’s regional role? • And whether it is allowed to remain a power or quietly neutralized?

When the missile becomes the problem, we are facing a project of neutralization… not reform. And when force is dismantled before the state is built, we are not facing sovereignty, but the re-engineering of weakness.

**🔵**[Link to the article in Arabic ](https://t.me/almuraqb/326)