Somaliland at the Crossroads: Geopolitics, Israeli Recognition, and International Law

🔴**Somaliland at the Crossroads: Geopolitics, Israeli Recognition, and International Law**

On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member state to officially recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. This move fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This analysis assesses the crisis through the political framework articulated by Mr. Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi in his speech dated 8 Rajab 1447 AH (28 December 2025), alongside established principles of international law.

**1. Historical Origins and the “De Facto” Paradox**

Somaliland, formerly a British protectorate, gained brief independence in 1960 before voluntarily uniting with the former Italian Somaliland. Following a bloody civil war and the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared the dissolution of that union. • **The 1991 Declaration:** It was grounded in the restoration of the 1960 borders rather than the creation of a new entity. • **Governance versus Recognition:** For 34 years, Somaliland has maintained an effective government, its own currency, and a security apparatus, in contrast to the volatility in Mogadishu. • **The Legal Vacuum:** Despite meeting the criteria of the Montevideo Convention (permanent population, defined territory, government), Somaliland remained unrecognized due to the African Union’s adherence to the principle of the “inviolability of borders” (Cairo Declaration, 1964), out of fear of opening a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist movements across the continent.

**2. Strategic Interests and the al-Houthi Framework**

In his Rajab 1447 AH speech, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi described the Israeli recognition as a “hostile act” and a “project to fragment the region.” • **Israel’s Objective:** Control of the Red Sea corridor. Recognition provides a potential military and intelligence hub near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a strategic chokepoint, facilitating monitoring of Houthi maritime operations and limiting the influence of regional competitors such as Turkey, which has invested heavily in Mogadishu. • **Regional Encirclement:** Al-Houthi views the move not as a localized diplomatic development but as part of a strategic encirclement of Yemen and the Axis of Resistance. • **Fragmentation:** From this perspective, the move serves to weaken the Federal Republic of Somalia, which has maintained a firm stance in support of Palestine, by entrenching its division.

**Other Beneficiaries of the Status Quo**

Local elites in Hargeisa gain legitimacy and investment through the Berbera port deals with the UAE, DP World, and now Israel, strengthening their rule amid accusations of democratic backsliding. External actors such as the UAE secure military bases (Berbera base), while Ethiopia seeks access to the Red Sea; Israel exploits these dynamics in positioning itself against the Houthis. Compared with Kosovo (Western-backed recognition) or Northern Cyprus (Turkish-backed isolation), the Somaliland case benefits actors who exploit divisions in the Horn of Africa without assuming full responsibility.

**Israel’s Strategic Calculations**

Somaliland’s 850-kilometer coastline along the Gulf of Aden grants Israel surveillance capabilities over Bab al-Mandeb, countering Houthi attacks on shipping and Iranian arms flows, with the potential to transform Berbera into an intelligence hub alongside Emirati facilities. This aligns with Israel’s broader strategy of encircling the Red Sea—through the Abraham Accords and links to Socotra—to pressure Yemen and address displacement narratives from Gaza. Al-Houthi, however, frames this as “regional fragmentation” extending beyond Somalia. Netanyahu’s timing also links domestic politics with maritime security amid escalating Houthi threats.

**3. Legal Status Under International Law**

The legitimacy of Israel’s recognition is contested by the Somali Federal Government, the African Union, and the Arab League. • **Territorial Integrity:** UN Resolution 1514 and the African Union’s Constitutive Act prioritize the territorial integrity of existing states.

The Somali Federal Government maintains that Somaliland is an “inseparable and inalienable” part of its territory. • **Authority to Recognize:** In international law, recognition is a political act by a sovereign state. While Israel may recognize any entity, such recognition is often considered void if it violates the sovereignty of another UN member state (Somalia). • **The “Occupying Entity” Argument:** Al-Houthi’s framework holds that recognition by Israel—described as an “occupying entity”—lacks moral and legal legitimacy, linking Palestinian statelessness to the “fragmentation” of Somalia.

**4. Regional Security and Militarization**

Recognition transforms an internal secessionist dispute into a high-risk maritime confrontation. • **Military Targets:** Al-Houthi explicitly declared that any Israeli presence in Somaliland constitutes a “military target,” raising the possibility of drone or missile strikes on Somaliland ports (such as Berbera) and linking the area to the ongoing Red Sea tanker war. • **Proxy Escalation:** Somalia has warned it will not tolerate foreign military bases that drag the country into proxy conflicts. The presence of Israeli intelligence or naval assets would likely provoke the Axis of Resistance and could alter Ethiopia’s security posture, particularly following its controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland. • **Axis Framing:** Al-Houthi portrays Somaliland as an Israeli “hostile foothold” tied to Palestine through a project of “reshaping the Middle East,” rhetorically merging anti-Zionism, Somali solidarity, and Red Sea defense. Strategically, this framing justifies strikes without requiring a new escalation, embedding Somaliland within resistance narratives against “fragmentation.”

**5. Policy Options and International Responses**

The international response has been largely condemnatory, prioritizing regional stability over Somaliland’s claims to self-determination. • **Multilateral Channels:** Somalia is mobilizing the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the African Union to isolate the recognition. The Chairperson of the African Union, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has already reaffirmed the principle of “non-interference with borders.” • **Diplomatic Reciprocity:** Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre described the move as “reckless,” suggesting that Israel recognize the State of Palestine instead. • **The Risk of Normalization:** Should other states follow Israel’s lead, the principle of territorial integrity in Africa would face a systemic challenge, potentially leading to “Balkanization,” as al-Houthi warns.

**Conclusion**

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is less a human-rights-based endorsement of self-determination than a geopolitical maneuver aimed at securing maritime dominance in the Red Sea. While Somaliland gains a powerful—albeit controversial—ally, it risks becoming a forward front in the broader regional confrontation between Israel and the Axis of Resistance. Under prevailing international law, the recognition remains a bilateral political act without the power to alter Somalia’s internationally recognized borders.

**🔵**[Link to the article in Arabic ](https://t.me/almuraqb/336)